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Abstract—Since the inception of cloud computing, security
researchers have been active in addressing the question of cloud
information security, which has seen the development of a
wide range of technical solutions. The same can be said for
non-cloud information security research which has been active
for a far longer period of time. Yet, year on year, security
breaches continue to increase, both in volume and in value. The
business architecture of a company comprises people, process and
technology. Is it not time to consider a different approach?
Keywords—security; privacy; standards; compliance; assur-
ance; audit; measurement; cloud service providers; service level
agreements; threat environment
I. INTRODUCTION
The goal of achieving information security is not trivial.
Indeed in cloud computing, the goal is all the more challenging
due to the richness and complexity of relationships between
the various actors involved in cloud ecosystems. Since the
inception of cloud computing, security researchers have been
very active in addressing the question of cloud information
security, which has seen the development of a wide range
of technical solutions. This does, however, present a possible
weakness in approach. Business architecture comprises people,
process and technology, thus any solution ignoring people and
process may potentially fail to achieve the desired result.
In earlier work with Pym [1], we developed a conceptual
framework to address cloud security which takes people, pro-
cess and technology into account. In this work, we identified
three key barriers to good cloud security, namely standards,
management method and complexity. We addressed compli-
ance with standards [2] as well as fundamental weaknesses
in that process [3], proposed management method [4], and
complexity along with the difficulties in addressing measure-
ment [5]. Having looked at our initial approach from the
perspective of the company implementing the framework, we
then considered the weaknesses that would still remain to
be addressed. We identified the following points which will
impact the successful implementation of the framework:
• Definition of security goals;




• Lack of responsibility and accountability.
We discussed these issues in our work on broadening the
service level agreement (SLA)[6] where we called for better
accountability from cloud service providers (CSP)s. There
is no doubt that it will take time for all these issues to
be properly addressed and resolved, and this introduces yet
another problem: the threat environment. It is not static, it will
not wait until we have proper measures in place to resist the
constant onslaught of attempts to relieve us of our money. It
is active now, 24/7, 365 days a year and is utterly relentless
in the quest to find more victims. Thus it makes sense to turn
our attention to this area.
We start by looking at research into the threat environment
in Section II and in Section III we consider research into
security breaches. The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows: in Section IV we consider what information we can
learn from security breach reports; in Section V we outline
the threats which are the most pressing; In Section VI we
discuss how we might go about addressing these threats; and
in Section VII we discuss our conclusions.
II. THE THREAT ENVIRONMENT
The threat environment faced by cloud computing is not
new. As long as computing has been around, there have been
security threats against it. A great deal of work has gone
into addressing this issue over many decades. Goldwasser
et al [7] present a digital signature scheme based on the
computational difficulty of integer factorisation. Addressing
threats to information systems, Loch et al [8] report on a study
investigating executives’ concern about a variety of threats.
A relatively new threat, computer viruses, was found to be
a particular concern, and the results highlight a gap between
the use of modern technology and the understanding of the
security implications inherent in its use.
Torr [9] reports that even security-conscious products can
fall prey when designers fail to understand the threats their
software faces or the ways in which adversaries might try to
attack it, and suggests the need to consider security needs
throughout the design process, just as is done with perfor-
mance, usability, localise-ability, serviceability, or any other
facet.
Howard and Lipner [10] detail a rigorous, proven method-
ology that measurably minimises security bugs. The authors
suggest: the use of a streamlined risk-analysis process to
find security design issues before code is committed; apply
secure-coding best practices and a proven testing process;
conduct a final security review before a product ships; arm
customers with prescriptive guidance to configure and deploy
a product more securely; establish a plan to respond to new
security vulnerabilities; and integrate security discipline into
agile methods and processes.
Chen et al [11] present a quantitative threat modelling
method, using value driven security threat modelling based
on attack path analysis. The authors demonstrate the steps of
using their method to analyse the cost-effectiveness of how
system patching and upgrades can improve security. Brown
and Hammill [12] suggest that once it was an environmental
issue, then an energy problem, and now climate change is
being recast as a security threat.
Johnston and Warkentin [13] investigate the influence of
fear appeals on the compliance of end users with recom-
mendations to enact specific individual computer security
actions toward the mitigation of threats. An examination was
performed that culminated in the development and testing of
a conceptual model representing an infusion of technology
adoption and fear appeal theories. The authors suggest that fear
appeals do impact end user behavioural intentions to comply
with recommended individual acts of security, but the impact
is not uniform across all end users.
Shaikh and Haider [14] aim to identify the most vulnerable
security threats in cloud computing, which will enable both
end users and vendors to know about the key security threats
associated with cloud computing. The authors’ work enables
researchers and security professionals to know about users’
and vendors’ concerns, and provide critical analysis of the
different security models and tools proposed. Garvey et al
[15] present a macro-analytic method for measuring economic-
benefit returns on investments in cyber-security. The authors
propose a mechanism which finds sets of Pareto efficient cost-
benefit investments, and their economic returns, that capture
tangible and intangible advantages of countermeasures that
strengthen cyber-security.
Xu et al [16] present a cloud computing based system for
cyber-security management and conduct extensive experiments
to show the effectiveness of their developed system, and also
discuss how to extend their proposed system to other appli-
cations. Shackelford et al [17] explore the Implications of the
2014 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
cyber-security framework on shaping reasonable national and
international cyber-security practices, and find that, given that
cyber-security best practices are not yet well defined, the NIST
framework has the potential to shape standards not only for
critical infrastructure firms but also for the private sector, and
also has the potential to shift the cyber-security landscape
internationally, especially in jurisdictions that largely favour a
voluntary approach to enhancing cyber-security. They further
suggest that the uptake of the NIST framework beyond the US
could help to foster a global standard of cyber-security care,
promoting consistency, benefiting businesses active across ju-
risdictions, and contributing to cyber peace.
There is some variety in they types of threats which com-
panies need to deal with. They can broadly be categorised into
five types of threat: cyber espionage and terrorists; fraudsters;
IT business risk; activist hackers; general criminal activity.
The threat from cyber espionage and terrorists will cer-
tainly be of concern. Often state sponsored, with a high level
of technical capability and vast resources at their disposal,
they will present a danger if the company is an attractive
target for them. Usually industrial companies with intellectual
property are a prime target for cyber espionage, particularly
in aerospace, and other advanced technical industries. Critical
infrastructure is generally the preferred target of the cyber
terrorist, although they are not averse to stealing a bit of cash
either.
The threat from fraudsters is certainly a worry, as they
tend to be extremely skilled in their practices and are ex-
cellent manipulators. The threat can arise from both within
the company and externally. A particular concern arises where
collusion occurs between an external fraudster and company
employees. Any industry which processes large volumes of
cash are at risk from this type of threat. IT business risk
presents an internal risk arising from a lack of understanding
on the part of management, which can lead to under providing
for IT business risk.
Pym et al [18] make the comment that the vast majority of
businesses do not fully understand what they do, thus making
it difficult to properly align IT systems to the underlying
business model, which can result in the inadvertent creation of
unexpected security vulnerabilities. The authors warn that there
needs to be a clear understanding of the two basic needs of a
control system. First, all data must include a rationale and a
purpose — so that people must know why things are measured
and, more importantly, what to do about them. Second, all
measurement must be based on careful analysis of the business,
so that the objectives of the business are linked to the things
over which managers and front-line personnel have control.
Only then can the recognition of a problematic measure lead
to the right actions that will correct it leading to improved
performance of the business as a whole.
The threat from activist hackers is an issue due to the fact
that they tend to be heavily committed to their cause, and are
often competent hackers. They usually target large corporates
for perpetrating perceived wrongdoing (in their view), with the
aim of exposing this wrongdoing. This can result in system
downtime, embarrassment and regulatory fines.
The threat from general criminal activity presents the
largest financial danger to companies. Some are not very
sophisticated in their knowledge levels. Others are highly
competent. They are out for one thing only — to line their own
pockets, by continuously probing company systems until they
find a weakness they can exploit. And they won’t just restrict
themselves to technological systems. They will be probing
company employees and attempting to find out about company
processes too.
Any company which fails to grasp the significance of this
threat will be doing themselves a great disservice. Remember
that globally, it is estimated [19] that 200,000 new pieces of
malware are developed every day — that is a total of 73 million
every year. All it takes is for one of these to succeed, and
the consequences could be severe. Consequently, management
must realise that proper security is not a technical exercise
that can be devolved to the IT department. Security is a key
element to the very survival of a company. Security should
quite properly be a key board responsibility, with a director
of sufficient experience to oversee the company approach to
security.
This means that the company needs to establish effective
security policies, implement proper security procedures which
are driven, and enforced, from the board down, and devise
adequate monitoring processes to ensure compliance. Staff
training is vital for success. All it takes is for one member
of staff to fall victim to a social engineering attack, or to open
an infected email to expose the whole business. No matter how
well trained in security practices the organisation is, security
will only ever be as good as the practice of the weakest
member of staff. Staff security training should also emphasise
the importance of accountability, assurance, audit, confiden-
tiality, compliance, integrity, privacy and responsibility where
relevant.
Company processes are often very well documented and
designed to optimise the efficiency of the organisation. All too
often, security was not included on the requirements list for
the processes. This presents a fundamental weakness to the
security of the organisation. Where security was not on the
original requirements list for company processes, they should
be reviewed to establish how effective each process is from a
security point of view in order to find any weaknesses in the
system. These weaknesses should be identified, and changes
made to improve security. All new processes being imple-
mented should also include a security requirement. This should
also be extended to cover other needs, such as accountability,
assurance, audit, confidentiality, compliance, integrity, privacy
and responsibility.
Companies should also regularly review their technological
systems to ensure they can provide a robust defence against
the threat environment. Remember, technology evolves very
rapidly. So does the threat environment. It is not static. It
dynamically changes day by day. As soon as a new vulnera-
bility is found, software developers race to find a solution. As
soon as patches are released, the bad guys race to counter the
patch. And so the vicious circle continues. Companies need to
keep on top of vulnerabilities and patch them promptly. Many
companies only update software once or twice a year. By the
time the next update comes along, the weaknesses may have
already been found and exploited by the bad guys. There may
not be any systems to update by the time the next update is
due. That is how serious a breach can be.
III. SECURITY BREACH RESEARCH
Pym et al [18], in discussing the quest of alignment of
IT to business needs, warn that there needs to be a clear
understanding of the two basic needs of a control system.
First, all data must include a rationale and a purpose — so
that people must know why things are measured and, more
importantly, what to do about them. Second, all measurement
must be based on careful analysis of the business, so that the
objectives of the business are linked to the things over which
managers and front-line personnel have control. Only then can
the recognition of a problematic measure lead to the right
actions that will correct it leading to improved performance
of the business as a whole.
Davis et al [20] report on two types of empirical research
conducted on cyber security breaches. In the first, where they
review reporting of cyber security incidents, they find that
the likelihood of a cyber security incident being reported in
specialised press increases with the total number of affected
customers, the company breached being publicly traded and
whether or not commercially sensitive information was lost.
In the second, where they considered security incidents for
mainly on-line businesses, they find that such incidents do not
affect the overall web traffic for such businesses.
Armbrust et al [21] provide a detailed review and explana-
tion of cloud computing, expressing concern over the increase
in security issues. They discuss how responsibilities need to
be properly addressed between the various actors involved, in
order to mitigate the effect of security breaches, both from
within the cloud, and externally. Blandford [22] discusses the
reluctance of business to take up cloud computing, citing
concern over potential security issues, outlining many of the
dangers with the cloud, endorsing the use of standards to
ensure security.
Monfared and Jaatun [23] review existing security monitor-
ing mechanisms and highlight possible weaknesses in existing
monitoring mechanisms, and propose approaches to mitigate
them, but recognise the field of cloud security is not yet
mature. Gordon et al [24] carry out a study on the effect
of information security breaches on market returns of firms.
Opara and Bell [25] investigate stiffening access to sensitive
data, and found no difference in the reported cases of breaches
on having a formal IT policy, external access from mobile
devices, and number of times clients were required to change
their passwords, regardless of the security protocol.
Wenge et al [26] warn of the dangers involved where
the lack of capacity, unplanned outages of sub-contractors, a
disaster recovery plan, acquisitions, or other financial goals
may force cloud providers to enter into collaborations with
other cloud providers. However, they explain that the cloud
provider is not always fully aware of the security level of
a potential collaborative cloud provider, which can lead to
security breaches and customers’ data leakage, ending in court
cases and financial penalties. They analyse different types of
cloud collaborations with respect to their security concerns and
discuss possible solutions, and outline trusted security entities
as a feasible approach for managing security governance risks
and propose their security broker solution for ad hoc cloud
collaborations. Armerding [27] describes the 15 worst data
security breaches of the 21st century.
There is a move to consider privacy in the healthcare arena.
Kwon and Johnson [28] explore information security practices
and identify practice patterns that are associated with improved
regulatory compliance in healthcare, providing security prac-
tice benchmarks for healthcare administrators which can help
policy makers in developing strategic and practical guidelines
for practice adoption. Taitsman et al [29] investigate protecting
patient privacy and data security in healthcare, identifying a
number of key areas of weakness.
Gordon et al [30] examine how the existence of well-
recognised externalities changes the maximum a firm should,
from a social welfare perspective, invest in cyber security
activities. By extending their cyber security investment model
to incorporate externalities, the authors show that the firm’s
social optimal investment in cyber security increases by no
more than 37% of the expected externality loss. Renaud and
Goucher [31] investigate the curious incidence of security
breaches by knowledgeable employees and the pivotal role a
of security culture in achieving better protection. Watkins [32]
prepares a report on the impact of cyber attacks on the private
sector for the Association for International Affairs, and warns
of the ever increasing threat level posed by cyber attacks.
Chou [33] analyses the risk and value components inside
cloud computing practice through a value creation model. Garg
and Camp [34] examine information security risk communi-
cation, which struggles with the challenges of explaining ever
evolving technology and corresponding risks to a non-technical
user base. The authors examine the relevance of nine canonical
characteristics of risk in explaining perceived risk online,
across five distinct mental models of risk communication
employed by security experts. They find that severity of con-
sequences, as well as whether the risk impacts one individual
at a time or several individuals at once, are the predominant
characteristics that inform risk perception of security risks,
irrespective of the mental model of risk communication.
IV. SECURITY BREACH REPORTS
A number of specialist security firms, such as Cisco [35],
Kaspersky [36], Microsoft [37], PWC [38], Symantec [39],
Trend [40], Trustwave [41] and Verizon [42], have maintained
an active interest in security breaches, and publish annual
reports on their findings.
We look at the top threats reported by two of these com-
panies during the period from 2010 to 2014. First, we chose
Verizon in TABLE I, since their analysis includes not only
their own figures, but includes figures provided by some 50
other organisations, including computer emergency response
teams (CERT)s, cyber centres, forensic providers, information
security (INFOSEC) product and service providers, informa-
tion sharing and analysis centres (ISAC)s and law enforcement
agencies. These reports provide a useful perspective on the
global impact of the threat environment.
Threat 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Hacking 2 1 1 1 1
Malware 3 2 2 2 2
Misuse by company employees 1 4 5 5 5
Physical theft or unauth. access 5 3 4 3 4
Social Engineering 4 5 3 4 3
TABLE I. Verizon Top 5 Security Breaches — 2010-2014 (1=Highest)
[43][44][45][46][47]
It is interesting to see that hacking, malware and social
engineering have continued to maintain a high position in
the chart. Clearly, criminals persist in using techniques which
work. While misuse by employees was initially the worst threat
in 2010, it quickly fell to bottom position for the following
years. In comparing this with the findings from 1992 [8], at
that time, hacking was considered the 7th worst threat, malware
was the 6th worst threat, and social engineering hadn’t been
heard of as a threat yet. The second reports we selected were
those from Price Waterhouse Cooper in TABLE II, which were
prepared for the UK government’s Department for Business,
Innovation and Skills, which provides us with a perspective
on the UK threat situation. These reports were historically
prepared every second year, although the information is now
available annually.
Threat 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Hacking 2 N/a 2 2 1
Malware 3 N/a 3 3 3
Misuse by company employees 1 Na 1 1 2
Physical (theft or unauthorised access) 4 N/a 4 4 4
TABLE II. PWC/BIS Top 4 Security Breaches — 2010-2014 (1=Highest)
[48][49][50][51]
While it is interesting to see that hacking and malware
mirrors the trend seen in the Verizon reports, misuse by
employees remains a consistently high threat to UK businesses.
In their latest breach report, Verizon [52] report the three
most favoured attack vectors are email attachments, email links
and web drive-by infections which account for 93.9% of all
successful attack vectors deployed today [52].
Companies need to use every possible resource available
to them in the fight against security breaches. Regular analysis
of freely available security breach reports will provide a clear
view of what the most serious current threats are to allow them
to better assess their defences.
V. THE MOST PRESSING THREATS
It is clear that on the internal side, of the three business
architecture elements of people, process and technology, the
greatest threat remains people. Process remains a concern and
while much good research on technical solutions has limited
the impact of technological threats on companies, this still
remains an issue. From the external side, hacking and malware
continue to pose a serious threat, with social engineering
continuing to find a place in the threat armoury.
The use of email attachments, email links and web drive-by
infections as a means of delivering threats is very concerning,
since these threats are not overly technically challenging to
resolve. Yet they remain the preferred attack vector of choice
for a reason — they continue to be successful, year on year.
These threat vectors apply across all companies, whether large
or small, and a little effort could go a long way to mitigating
these attacks.
Of course, for the larger companies, a more concerning
issue is the increase in advanced persistent threats (APT)s and
targeted attacks. These are more worrying, because these types
of attack tend to be perpetrated by adversaries who have much
greater technical competence and resources at their disposal.
Many are state-sponsored, but hacktivists, who can be very
competent and determined, also can fall into this category.
Compromise from these attacks can be far more costly to the
business, and far more difficult and expensive to resolve.
Yet rather worryingly, the average time between compro-
mise and discovery can be over 200 days [52]. In the company
security threat model shown in Fig. 1 below, we can see how
the different threat vectors are used against a company. As we
can see from the previous section, it is a worry that the top
three attacks against people account for 93.9% of all successful
attacks.
VI. HOW TO ADDRESS THESE CURRENT THREATS
Back in 2002, Gordon and Loeb [54] developed an eco-
nomic security model to determine the optimum amount com-
panies should spend on information security, noting that many
Fig. 1. A Company Security Threat Model
companies often spent far more than they needed to, and often
on the wrong areas to optimise their return on investment.
In 2008, the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) [55] published a guide for mapping types of informa-
tion and information systems to security categories, in which
they took a risk based approach to security. One of the key
elements of this guide was the trade-off between criticality
and sensitivity. NIST define criticality as: “a measure of the
degree to which an organization depends on the information or
information system for the success of a mission or of a business
function”; and sensitivity as: “used in this guideline to mean
a measure of the importance assigned to information by its
owner, for the purpose of denoting its need for protection”.
We can usefully apply these principles in any approach to
achieving better security for optimal cost.
People are likely to be the weakest link in companies and
continue to present a danger to their security, not just from
misuse but also from naı¨vety of behaviour. Better, continu-
ing education can certainly help here. This education should
concentrate on the key areas of risk, and how to mitigate the
impact of these threat vectors.
Developing a good security culture within the organisation
is always a positive step, although it may be necessary to
motivate some employees through penalties for consistent
abuses of security policy. Companies should carry out regular
reviews of their processes to ensure they are, or remain, secure,
updating as necessary to reflect emerging trends. All company
systems should be reviewed for security regularly in the light
of the evolving threat environment, ensuring security patches
are updated regularly.
As to the serious threats posed by the favoured attack
vectors, a simple policy change could present an effective im-
provement overnight for minimal cost. Automatic deletion of
attachments from unknown email users could be implemented
simply at a systems level to remove this threat quickly.
Similarly, stripping email links from unknown email users
could be effected very simply at a systems level. Implement
a validation procedure for all incoming email messages is
another option that could be used to filter out unwanted traffic.
In the longer term, some technical changes to email software
could be developed to validate properly the true source of all
email traffic, with automatic deletion of traffic failing the test.
Better restriction could be introduced to ensure employees do
not access questionable web sites, thus minimising the impact
of drive-by infections.
VII. CONCLUSION
So what is the answer to the question, should we be using a
different approach? Rather annoyingly, the answer is both no,
and yes. Current approaches, which are usually highly techni-
cal in nature, are a response to the increasingly complex nature
of information security in the cloud. We must necessarily
continue with this approach to ensure that increasing technical
complexity does not create new vulnerabilities for those with
criminal intent to exploit, so the answer here is no. However, it
is also clear that many of the simplest vulnerabilities are being
ignored, thus leaving systems greatly exposed to exploitation,
and thus our answer must be yes.
Thus it is clear that the research community needs to
remember to consider that many of the more simple threats
remain a serious problem. As noted in Section IV above, just
three very familiar approaches — the use of email attachments,
email links and web drive-by infections account for 93.9%
of all successful attacks. Simple threats can often provide a
valuable return on investment to address. While they might be
less intellectually challenging than many of the more technical
issues being worked on today, nevertheless some attention to
this area could have a meaningful impact on lowering the cost
of security breaches.
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